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The pressure on agricultural production systems to achieve global food security, in the context of growing demands and the degradation of natural resources, makes it necessary to rethink 
current production systems towards more sustainable models.
In agriculture, environmental sustainability means good stew-
ardship of the natural systems and resources that farms rely on. 
Among other things, this involves rotating crops and embracing 
diversity, planting cover crops, no-till systems (or reduced till), 
integrated pest management, integration between livestock and 
crops, agroforestry practices and precision farming. The general 
aim of sustainable agricultural policies is that they ensure envi-
ronmental sustainability while enhancing, or at least maintaining, 
farm productivity.
At present, competing uses for land and water resources con-
tribute to the degradation of natural resource capital, a situation 
that may exacerbate present-day and intergenerational con-
sequences for farmers, other users and the wider population. 
Sustainable agricultural practices protect the ecosystem through 
the more efficient use of natural resources and strengthened 
capacity for adaptation to climate change and climate variability1. 
Therefore, their adoption may have significant benefits for the envi-
ronment. Moreover, the adoption of sustainable practices is likely 
to help achieve more resilient and productive food systems and 
enable sustainable production, which would serve to reduce pov-
erty and advance food security2,3. Sustainable agriculture therefore 
has the potential to directly contribute to several of the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030, 
including those relating to poverty (SDG 1), hunger (SDG 2), 
decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), reducing inequali-
ties (SDG 9), responsible consumption and production (SDG 12), 
climate action (SDG 13), life below water (SDG 14) and life on 
land (SDG 15).
The adoption of these sustainable practices usually requires 
concrete incentives, significant effort from farmers and the sup-
port of governments and public–private partnerships at national 
and local levels. However, the decision to adopt sustainable agricul-
tural practices in response to incentive programmes is not a binary 
process. Adoption depends on many factors: the conditions of the 
programme and the incentives offered, as well as the farmers’ envi-
ronmental preferences, economics and cultural characteristics4,5. 
Agricultural market trends also affect producers’ decisions6.
This scoping review is thus motivated by the need to systemati-
cally evaluate the evidence base 6 the effects of incentives offered to 
farmers to adopt sustainable agricultural practices. To this end, this 
scoping review examines nearly 18,000 papers on the various incen-
tives that are offered to farmers by governments, non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations, development banks and 
other market actors such as consumers and enterprises.
Three kinds of incentives (market and non-market, regula-
tions and cross-compliance, Box 1), as well as their compulsory 
or voluntary nature, are assessed to determine whether the type 
of the incentive affects farmers’ willingness to adopt. This scoping 
review also examines the relationship between farmer’s adoption of 
sustainable practices and three types of outcomes: environmental, 
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productivity and economic. Finally, the scoping review draws 
conclusions on the effectiveness of incentives and the adoption 
of sustainable farming practices to achieve the desired outcomes. 
These incentive–adoption–outcome pillars, and the links between 
them, offer a consistent logic by which to evaluate best practices in 
sustainable agricultural policy.
This scoping review also considers the broader demographic, 
social, environmental and economic factors that may drive the 
observed linkages between incentive, adoption and outcome.
This scoping review finds that regardless of the incentive type, 
linking programmes to economic benefits (productivity or prof-
itability) is essential for farmers to adopt sustainable agriculture 
practices in the short term6,7. In the long term, one of the strongest 
motivations for farmers to adopt and maintain sustainable prac-
tices is perceived positive outcomes of adoption for their farm or 
the environment8–11. Beyond this, there are important analysis gaps 
in the existing literature, particularly regarding the interrelation-
ships between the selected incentives, the adoption of best agricul-
tural practices and outcomes. Some suggestions on the next lines of 
research are included in the analysis.
Results
The purpose of this scoping review is to understand how incentives 
motivate the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices and, ulti-
mately, how and whether they result in measurable outcomes. This 
scoping review looked at the overall landscape of evidence of these 
instruments and their effectiveness in achieving the key outcomes. 
As in any scoping review, article screening against the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria took place in three phases: title screening, abstract 
screening and full-text screening (Box 2).
This resulted in 577 articles that were evaluated for relevance 
in terms of connecting either incentives to adoption, adoption to 
measurable outcomes or both sets of links. A machine 
learning-based approach helped to identify and cluster common 
terms and topics covered by the three incentive types (Fig. 1). 
Programmes fell into three broad categories related to ecosystem 
and environmental interventions, socioeconomic interventions 
and technological solutions. Articles typically showcased multiple 
interventions, with 36% of the total programmes falling under the 
technical category, and 32% each falling under the ecosystem and 
socioeconomic categories.
To better understand the links between incentive, adoption and 
outcome, a stratified random sample of 99 citations were selected 
from the 577 articles for additional review and data extraction. Of 
these, six articles were excluded as they were published in a lan-
guage not spoken by any of the authors of this research or because 
full-text versions could not be located.
The subset of 93 articles facilitated more in-depth review of the 
incentive types. Each article contained a link between either incen-
tives and adoption or adoption and outcomes, or both. For each 
article, the incentive types were identified, farmers’ adoption behav-
iours as described in the articles were recorded and the correspond-
ing outcomes were noted as a function of the incentives. We found 
that market and non-market incentives tend to be the most preva-
lent mechanism (Fig. 2), whereas all three incentive categories are 
used more or less uniformly to achieve environmental outcomes. 
Furthermore, profitability-related outcomes tend to require bal-
anced incentive structures, whereas productivity-related outcomes 
tend to be more market and non-market-oriented (Fig. 2).
Given the importance of understanding when and how incen-
tives drive farmers’ adoption behaviours and how the adoption of 
Box 1 | Incentives, definitions and categories
Incentives are instruments used by the public and private sectors 
to encourage farmers to protect or enhance ecosystem services 
beneficial to them and others (for example, water quality, soil 
care, forestry), while simultaneously improving the productivity 
(yields, labour per hectare and so on) and the competitiveness 
(such as cost per hectare, profitability, farm incomes) of the agri-
cultural sector. These were classified into three categories.
Market-based incentives encourage behavioural change 
by providing economic incentives through market signals. 
Examples of these include prices of input and output, subsidy, 
compensation, income transfer and other incentives in cash or 
in kind to agricultural producers. Non-market incentives are a 
broad basket. The parties of the Paris Agreement expressed that 
a non-market-based mechanism can be anything, provided it is 
not market-based51. This includes technical support, technology 
transfer and fiscal measures, such as putting a price on carbon or 
applying taxes to improve environmental sustainability.
Regulatory measures are general rules or specific actions 
imposed by government agencies or private entities to enhance 
environmental and economic outcomes through improved 
practices. Examples include certifications and environmental 
laws and standards. In general, they are mandatory.
Cross-compliance incentives link direct payments to 
farmers’ compliance with basic standards concerning the 
environment. They also require farmers to maintain land 
in good agricultural and environmental condition. In this 
case, they are mostly voluntary. Examples of these include 
government subsidies that are conditional on farmers adhering 
to certain environmental practices.
Box 2 | Abridged methods
A double-blind title and abstract screening was performed on 
17,936 articles using the following inclusion and exclusion criteria:
 1. Studies published in 1994 or later.
 2. Studies with an explicit focus on incentives for sustainable 
environmental agricultural practices.
 3. Studies with an explicit focus on adoption of sustainable en-
vironmental agricultural practices.
 4. Studies that explicitly connect the adoption of agricultural 
practices to sustainability outcomes.
 5. Studies with an explicit analysis of the impact of incentives 
on income, production, productivity, profits and/or envi-
ronmental sustainability.
 6. Original research (qualitative and quantitative reports) and/
or review of existing research including grey literature.
The resulting 1,792 articles were subjected to a second round 
of rapid review by abstract. This resulted in 577 articles that met 
the a priori inclusion criteria. A stratified random sample of 99 of 
these articles were selected for the next step,: full-text screening.
We performed data extraction on 93 of the studies (6 excluded 
for issues of availability or language). A data extraction template 
(available in the Supplementary Information) was developed to 
document the data, study type and context of each citation and 
all themes of interest.
Why is this method so important?
Unlike a typical narrative review, a scoping review strives to 
capture all of the literature on a given topic and reduce authorial 
bias. Scoping reviews offer a unique opportunity to explore 
the evidence in agricultural fields to address questions relating 
to what is known about a topic; what can be synthesized from 
existing studies to develop policy or practice recommendations; 
and what aspects of a topic are yet to be addressed by researchers.
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specific practices leads to the desired outcomes, additional analysis 
was needed. We further limited the subset of papers to only those 
that had a complete set of links between the incentive–adoption–
outcome pillars (44 papers) (Supplementary Annex 1). The results 
of this exercise illustrate how many of the papers with the full logic 
actually addressed multiple incentive categories and outcomes 
(Fig. 3). This is an important finding, as it bolsters the earlier obser-
vation that multipronged, integrated development interventions, 
both in terms of incentive structure and expected outcomes, are 
relatively commonplace. It is also important to note that although 
environmental and profitability outcomes are more or less equally 
supported by all three incentives, profitability outcomes are more 
supported by market or non-market incentives.
There is a clear general association between market and 
non-market incentives and environmental outcomes (Fig. 3). 
Nearly half of the interventions seen in the full-text review are 
considering market or non-market incentives and, simultane-
ously, just over 40% of the outcomes had an explicit environmental 
focus (Fig. 4). In general terms, this illustrates that, given appro-
priate design, market/non-market incentives can be successfully 
paired with environmental outcomes. Similarly important, it is 
clear that regulatory-based incentives are either less adequately 
documented or generally less prevalent in the development com-
munity’s menu of incentive-based approaches (left side of Fig. 4). 
Combined with the previous figures linking incentives to multiple 
outcome types (Figs. 2 and 3), there is support for the idea that 
development interventions tend to be moving away from simple 
productivity-enhancing approaches towards a more holistic style 
of engagement (Fig. 4 right side).
Assessment of the evidence base. For this study, the incentive–
adoption–outcome logic is only valid if evidence is present in the 
full-text review that backs up the claims regarding the outcomes. 
Although an assessment of evidence is not typically carried out as 
part of a scoping review12,13, we opted to undertake one to under-
stand when and how evidence was used to support assertions 
regarding inventive–adoption–outcome logic. The review team 
undertook a subjective assessment to label each study according 
to the strength of the evidence presented and the quality of the 
methodology used.
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Fig. 1 | Summary of the predominant programme types treated in the literature. All programmes that appeared in more than 20 of the 577 articles are 
included. Note that the machine learning approach used to tag the articles by topic distinguished terms as used in the articles.
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Assessments of the quality of the methodology are based on 
the clarity of the research question, justification of the research 
approach given the question of the study, clear description of the 
methodology used and robustness of the chosen methodology. Each 
article was scored on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the lowest. The find-
ings were summarized by intervention type and outcome (Fig. 5). 
From the 44 articles, 23% received the highest score, followed by 
32% with a quality index of 4 and 39% with a score of 3. Less than 
10% of the papers were assigned a number lower than 3, which is 
why there is no yellow border line in the figure. It is important to 
notice that one article may be included in more than one cell, as it 
may include more than one incentive and/or outcome.
Relatively speaking, there was a general lack of clear measure-
ment of outcomes, with only 50% of the reviewed papers present-
ing strong evidence (that is, evidence backed by robust analysis and 
clearly articulated support). Furthermore, evidence for incentive–
outcome relationships is unequally distributed, in terms of the qual-
ity and quantity of available evidence, across both the incentive and 
outcome types (Fig. 5).
This evidence analysis suggests that there is a robust evidence 
base for environmental outcomes associated with cross-compliance 
incentives. Likewise, there is strong evidence linking market/
non-market incentives and profitability-related outcomes. Both 
of these observations are generally consistent with the broader lit-
erature. This illustrates the need to substantiate measurement and 
reporting of evidence, especially in relation to the regulatory-based 
approaches. The current analysis suggests that understanding of 
regulatory approaches is generally less present in the literature, 
even though the methodologies were deemed relatively strong. 
Regulatory interventions tend to target environmental outcomes, 
but not exclusively, and are often associated with profitability and 
productivity-enhancing outcomes (Figs. 2 and 3). Given the general 
emphasis on cross-compliance and market/non-market approaches, 
perhaps more attention is needed to examine the scope and efficacy 
of regulatory approaches.
The available evidence allows us to make some standardized 
conclusions about the effectiveness of incentives for the adoption 
of sustainable agricultural practices, and the associated productivity 
and economic outcomes. However, there is little or no evidence on 
environmental outcomes, as most of the evidence on this respect 
is qualitative. Most papers only made an approximation of changes 
towards improvements in agricultural practices and environmental 
outcomes through qualitative assessment of farmer’s perceptions.
Additional evidence on the effectiveness of incentives in promot-
ing the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices and the associ-
ated outcomes is required to move beyond qualitative assessment of 
farmer’s perceptions. In selected papers where there are reliable data 
and easy monitoring of implemented sustainable systems, there is no 
systematic follow-up of the environmental impacts. The results are 
only measurable through the improvements in the productivity and 
profitability of producers9. For measuring potential environmental 



































































Fig. 2 | Recorded links between incentives, adoption and outcomes. The links are from the subset of 93 articles, colour-coded by outcome.
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incentives versus non-receiving farmers8,9,12,14 or relate socioeconomic 
characteristics of participants versus non-participants8,15.
Most papers simply state the participation rates in terms of the 
percentage of potential beneficiaries and explain them using influ-
encing factors. Some papers model the adoption according to dif-
ferent incentive levels (such as different tax or levels of payments for 
environmental services (PES))10,16–19. In those articles, no complete 
evidence was found connecting incentives with adoption and out-
comes. Stronger identification strategies are also needed to uncover 
the causal effect of the chain of incentives, adoption and outcomes. 
We found no randomized controlled trial studies in the selected 


































































































Fig. 3 | Associations between categories of outcomes and the type of incentive used. The 44 full-text reviews are included (read from left to right).  
See Supplementary Annex 1 for the associated list of papers.
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kinds of experiments are key to more accurately testing the effec-
tiveness of policy interventions, technologies and practices, taking 
into account socioeconomic, geographical and environmental influ-
ential factors. This scoping review reveals important research gaps: 
methods to detect causal pathways and to quantify the connections.
Type of incentive. However, despite weaknesses and limitations in 
the evidence base, the evidence provided by previous programmes 
on what has worked and what needs to be improved is important to 
consider when designing future incentive programmes. Looking at 
the articles reviewed in this scoping review, some interesting aspects 
for each of the three incentive categories can be highlighted (Fig. 6).
Market and non-market-based incentives. One of the general 
strengths of market-based incentives is that they offer flexible 
adoption to promote specific behaviour changes. Examples of this 
include altering market prices, setting a cap or altering quantities 
of a particular good, improving the way a market works, or creating 
a market where none previously existed (for example, water trad-
ing)20. However, one of the weaknesses of market-based incentives 
and their flexibility is that they can lead to negative social, environ-
mental and economic changes that were unplanned or not in line 
with the intended strategic direction10. For example, subsidies may 
increase the adoption of intercropping and residue mulching, but 
these practices may crowd out adoption of zero tillage21.
However, a lack of flexibility has been linked to low adoption 
levels as farmers’ previous experiences of using a particular agri-
cultural practice may significantly influence the types of policy 
instrument they will apply5. For example, promoting the use of 
specific crops for the incorporation of nutrients into the soil is 
more likely to be adopted by farmers who already practice crop 
rotation21–23. This is particularly pertinent for non-market incen-
tives, for which it is important to understand the interaction 
between a particular practice and the policy instruments designed 
to achieve its uptake.
Regulatory incentives. Some studies show that instruments per-
ceived as inflexible or too complex, such as legal regulations, were 
the least preferred by farmers5. Indeed, for regulatory measures, 
such as forest laws or watershed management programmes, the 
adoption of practices depends on the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment, supervision and monitoring. For this reason, the adoption 
of regulatory measures is often linked to accompanying measures 
such as information sharing, capacity building, technical assistance, 
training support for the local population and farmer-to-farmer 
communication networks that build trust and enhance understand-
ing of the potential benefits of conservation practices24. Agricultural 
extension services, both public and private, have been shown to 
have a positive impact on adoption rates5,7,12,15,23,25–28. Connecting 
these programmes with national extension systems can result in a 
significant change in agricultural sustainability.
To increase their effectiveness, regulatory measures are often 
linked to economic incentives including forest trade quotas, cer-
tification, access to rural credits or benefits in insurance markets. 
For example, voluntary community-based programmes are often 
coupled with short-term financial support to incentivize partici-
pation25,29. To improve efficiency in the adoption of the promoted 

























Fig. 4 | Relative proportions of incentives and outcomes. a, Incentives. b, Outcomes. The proportions are expressed as the percentage of the totals across 










Fig. 5 | Evidence map. The map shows articles reviewed by intervention and outcomes (subset of 44 articles). The sizes of the circles correspond to the 
number of reviews in each category. The fill colours indicate the level of evidence, with dark blue representing strong evidence and light blue representing 
weak evidence. The border colours indicate the quality of the methodology; red is used for methodologies that are generally strong and yellow where there 
are concerns over the methodologies.
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and expected benefits differ depending on individual farmers and 
geographical location16.
Cross-compliance incentives. Cross-compliance incentives help over-
come the barriers that make the adoption of sustainable practices 
unattractive, such as large up-front adoption costs, lack of capital, 
restricted access to financial markets and the need to provide for 
the household’s short-term economic needs. They are based on the 
hypothesis that incentives should at least compensate for the income 
loss or additional costs of adopting sustainable practices; and that 
there should be clear monitoring processes that ensure compliance 
with the conditionality (the adoption of the sustainable practice).
The main cross-compliance incentives are PES or 
agri-environment payments. These are incentives offered to farm-
ers, or landowners, in exchange for managing their land to provide 
some type of ecological service, including water quality, forestry, soil 
erosion and air pollution. In the case of resource conservation in 
the Ecuadorian Andes, it was shown that when conservation tech-
nologies were offered in conjunction with measures that enhance 
the short-term profitability of agriculture (such as new crops, bio-
logical barriers and improved agricultural production), the adop-
tion of conservation practices increased significantly8. Similar 
results were found in the Nepal Knowledge Based Integrated 
Sustainable Agriculture and Nutrition (KISAN) project30. These 
two examples reflect the broader finding that in most of the 
reported PES case studies, socioeconomic and environmental out-
comes have been positive8,15,30, especially if the PES is accompanied 
by technical assistance7,12.
Discussion
The decision by farmers to adopt sustainable agricultural prac-
tices in response to incentive programmes is not a binary process. 
Adoption is a continuum that depends on many factors: the condi-
tions of the programme, the incentives offered, the environmental 
preferences, personal perspectives, experience and education of 
farmers4. Farmers’ decisions are shaped by personal opinions, such 
as preferences over conservation measures, beliefs about the pro-
gramme and degrees of risk aversion21,31. Factors such as income 
levels, asset ownership, age, and access to other economic oppor-
tunities also correlate with the decision to adopt, as they affect the 
capacity of the target population to reap benefits from the progra
mme5–7,12,29,32–34. The decision to adopt is also affected by the bio-
physical characteristics of the land plot, and the institutional and 
policy context. Even agricultural market trends affect producers’ 
decisions to adopt agricultural practices3,6. The variety of factors 
that contribute to the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices 
necessitates the consideration of context in policy design and the 
use of differentiated policy instruments16.
Incentives across the spectrum. Direct economic benefits, increased 
productivity or profitability seem to be the essential condition for 
the adoption of sustainable practices in the short term7. Regardless 
of the incentive type, adoption rates are higher when programmes 
offer short-term economic benefits than those solely aimed at 
providing a positive ecological outcome. For example, restrictive 
land-use-change programmes, such as those induced by climate 
change, which modify the incentives for engaging in agricultural 
production, agroforestry and other land uses have higher adoption 
rates when they are connected with an improvement in income13,15.
Nevertheless, and independent of the incentive type, in the long 
term it seems that one of the strongest motivations for farmers to 
adopt and maintain sustainable practices is the perceived positive 
outcomes of these practices for their farm or the environment8–11. 
For example, the greatest motivating factor for participation in 
a forest conservation scheme in Kenya was the ‘will to conserve’, 
influenced by the local communities’ concern for the degradation 
of their environment and their perceived dependency on natural 
resources11. The will to participate was based on the perceived ben-
efits of conservation, especially changes in water availability, which 
were reinforced by the potential benefits of new income-generating 
activities. This suggests that incentives can lead to the adoption of 
sustainable practices and have positive effects on ecological services, 
even without direct payments. If participants perceive future bene-
fits of sustainable practices, the likelihood of adoption increases15,29.
Compulsory or voluntary incentives. The likelihood of a farmer 
adopting the associated sustainable agricultural practice depends on 
whether the incentive is compulsory or voluntary5. Voluntary incen-
tive programmes, such as market and non-market-based incentives 
or certification schemes (for example, carbon footprints, water foot-
prints, organic farming), have a high degree of uncertainty as they 
depend on the decision of farmers to adopt sustainable practices. In 
general, if the economic incentives or payment levels do not offset 
the costs of adoption (cover opportunity costs of changing produc-
tion techniques or for the most productive land uses), farmers will 
rarely switch to the desired practices. However, if payment levels 
compensate, or overcompensate, for income losses and additional 
costs, then the willingness of farmers to adopt is normally high.
In contrast, the uptake of sustainable agricultural practices due 
to compulsory incentives is fairly certain. Regulatory measures, 
such as legal regulations, reduce uncertainty by imposing sanctions 
for non-compliance. The adoption of regulatory measures depends 
on the effectiveness of law enforcement, supervision and monitor-
ing; however, if institutions are able to enforce the sanctions, the 
uncertainty surrounding adoption is low or non-existent28.
The degree of uncertainty in the adoption of sustainable prac-
tices is closely linked to contradictions between the preferences 
of farmers and society. Farmers may prefer the short-term finan-
cial support and flexibility offered by voluntary incentive pro-
grammes, which, being voluntary, tend to create more uncertainty 
in the achievement of the programme’s environmental goals. This 
can conflict with society’s preference for longer-term instruments, 
such as legal regulations, which tend to reduce uncertainty in the 
achievement of outcomes.
Broader contextual factors. Throughout all stages in the incentive–
adoption–outcome chain, wider contextual factors play an impor-
tant role. Ignorance of the practices promoted and the opportunity 
costs from foregone activities due to limitations on land use and 
restrictions on the use of some management practices may deter 
participation by some farmers16,29,35. Complexity, inflexibility and 
complicated procedures are also salient obstacles for participa-
tion5,15,16. Therefore, the timescale, desired outcome and target pop-
ulation must be considered in all aspects of sustainable agricultural 















Fig. 6 | Pillars and linkages. The diagram illustrates the pathways between 
the three pillars.
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The effectiveness of a particular incentive, and the likelihood 
of adoption, varies depending on the agricultural practice that 
one wants to promote and the associated (predicted) outcomes5. 
Within this, there are a multitude of factors that determine the 
perceived and actual costs and benefits, both direct and indirect, 
of adopting sustainable practices. The attributes of the programme 
determine the likelihood of adoption, which is influenced by the 
perception of an improvement in net benefit and access to alterna-
tive markets. In some cases, positive outcomes—such as increases in 
yields—may not be enough to compensate for the higher input and 
capital requirements of the proposed agricultural interventions36. 
Therefore, economic incentives are necessary and need to be large 
enough to compensate for the opportunity cost of change, taking 
into consideration that the effects on outcomes take time to realize.
Outcomes may not be obvious in the short term; there may be 
a substantial time lag associated with the uptake of new practices 
and the expected results. For example, in examining fruit farmers in 
Uruguay, it was found that even with clear evidence of the adoption 
of specific practices, the expected outcomes took different times 
to materialize37. In the case of productivity, there may actually be 
negative consequences in the short run. Therefore, the link between 
adoption and outcome requires consideration of the time horizon.
Broader findings to boost adoption. The important comple-
mentary role of technical assistance and extension services also 
emerges strongly from several papers within this scoping review. 
Technical assistance, training and extension agents, both public 
and private, enhance the rate of adoption for all incentive mecha-
nisms7,12,15,22,23,27,28. Beyond this, additional assistance programmes 
boost short-term benefits, and ensure the long-term sustainability 
and inclusiveness of the incentives. For example, where PES incen-
tives (cross-compliance) were accompanied by additional technical 
assistance, the sustainability of the sustainable outcomes beyond the 
life of the PES contract could be expected7,12,27,29,37. The availability of 
technical support or other complementary practices is particularly 
pertinent to regulatory incentives, for which a key criticism is their 
complexity. In these cases, an increased knowledge and understand-
ing of environmental services and regulations can boost adoption5,24. 
Overall, the provision of information and technical assistance 
regarding sustainable practices can foster a higher take-up rate of 
the programmes and a broader retention of the practices5,11,15,23,38.
Beyond this, training programmes and the introduction 
of locally adapted technologies can contribute to changing prac-
tices even without other types of incentives or interventions if they 
present economic advantages for their users. Adoption can be 
enhanced by the promotion of sustainable farming activities by a 
development organization or farmers’ associations, coupled with 
marketing activities15,25.
Trade-offs in outcomes. Sustainable policies should seek to adopt 
an integrated approach that addresses both short-term priori-
ties such as profitability, while simultaneously working towards 
long-term environmental outcomes. The design of these instru-
ments often entails trade-offs among the long-term outcomes, dif-
ferent environmental objectives, and equity and efficiency goals.
In designing sustainable agricultural policy, it may be necessary 
to prioritize and make trade-offs between different environmental 
objectives. For example, quantity-based market-based incentives 
(MBIs) such as water trading may reallocate water to ‘high-value’ 
users, such as mining, manufacturing and electricity production 
from ‘low-value’ users, such as agricultural producers25. As some 
high-value users produce high levels of greenhouse gas emissions, 
achieving the goals for water use may come at a cost for the goal 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In such cases, an additional 
measure, such as a regulatory mechanism, may be put in place 
to minimize the potential trade-off17. The design of sustainable 
agricultural policies, and their incentives, therefore requires a 
broad assessment and consideration of the potential outcomes, 
and their consequences.
In some cases, trade-offs in socioeconomic and environmental 
outcomes may be required, as effectively attaining environmental 
outcomes may deepen economic inequality. The evidence shows 
that targeting wealthier landowners can produce greater impacts 
on environmental outcomes29. Wealthier landowners may be able 
to have a higher impact on environmental outcomes than poorer 
farmers who face much higher opportunity costs from adopting 
sustainable practices, chief among them subsistence production. If 
programmes are targeted at regions with higher wealth and envi-
ronmental degradation to maximize the achievement of environ-
mental goals, it is likely that a larger percentage of wealthier owners 
will enrol in the programme and the poorest ones will be excluded. 
If financial incentives are provided, the income of the wealthier 
landowners will further increase, enhancing income disparities. 
Consequently, it may not always be possible to simultaneously 
achieve different environmental and equity development goals with 
the same policy tool. Indeed, several papers in this scoping review 
point out the potential for conflict associated with equity and effi-
ciency13,29, a subset of which suggested that the environmental effi-
ciency of these approaches should justify their adoption in certain 
instances. In general, the alignment of equity and efficiency will 
occur only if the geographical location of the programme overlaps 
with the location of poor farmers.
An alternative approach is to target incentive programmes 
at the lands most vulnerable to land-use change or farmers more 
reluctant to adopt sustainable practices to promote additionality. 
Additionality measures the net result from an intervention and 
is defined as the product of environmental service provision (for 
example, hydrological services, biodiversity conservation, carbon 
sequestration and landscape beauty services) and deforestation 
probability, resulting from an PES22. The question therefore is if 
and when incentive programmes are necessary to encourage adop-
tion. Farmers who are more likely to adopt incentive programmes 
are often located in regions in which deforestation risks are lower, 
have stronger preferences for conservation programmes, the oppor-
tunity costs from adopting sustainable practices are lower, or the net 
benefits of adoption are high regardless of the economic incentives. 
Hence, the incentives might not be the real driver for adopting sus-
tainable practices, and adopters might participate in the programme 
regardless of the incentives. Incentive programmes should therefore 
target vulnerable areas to ensure additionality of the programme 
and the most effective use of resources.
Furthermore, the measure of outcomes should account for the 
trade-offs among different types of incentives—or how differ-
ent incentive types could complement one another to achieve the 
desired outcomes. Indeed, multipronged programmes that incor-
porate social, economic and productivity components are more 
likely to succeed in developing countries. This echoes the findings 
of Giller et al.39, whose review of conservation agriculture and sus-
tainable intensification technologies and practices suggests that 
a systems approach, combining the tools of experimentation and 
simulation modelling, should be adopted to evaluate multiscale 
trade-offs and synergies. This will provide the toolbox and methods 
to allow informed choices of technologies and practices tailored to 
local conditions (Box 3).
Recommendations. Incentive programmes need to be well tar-
geted, effective and efficient while taking into account spatial differ-
ences, differences in economic activities and types and the number 
of economic, social and environmental outcomes pursued, as well 
as budget limitations. The design of such programmes, which are 
also flexible, simple to implement and cost effective, is not an easy 
task and requires a collective effort and good data. A challenge for 
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the future is to reduce the cost and allocate more resources to the 
collection of detailed data. This is a condition for the estimation 
of environmental services such as biodiversity, carbon services 
(that require information on the amount of stored carbon before 
and after an adopted practice) or hydrological services (that require 
information on site-specific soil characteristics, vegetation cover, 
slope, distribution and intensity of precipitation). Similarly, the qual-
ity and availability of data are frequently inadequate for more pre-
cise measures of the cost of participation in incentive programmes.
Beyond the specific incentives examined in this scoping review, 
it is still necessary to improve the general conditions influencing 
agricultural systems and practices for sustainable outcomes of the 
whole sector (Box 3). Agricultural institutions, policies and regula-
tions, social protection, infrastructure and markets, relative prices, 
off-farm employment opportunities, structural poverty and the 
scarcity of asset endowments all influence the capacity and willing-
ness of farmers to invest in land, water and forest conservation and 
to pursue sustainable practices. These are discussed in some papers 
as conditioning factors. Nevertheless, there is still the need to better 
understand the interrelationships between these factors, incentives, 
adoption and outcomes.
Methods
Evidence synthesis methodology and protocol pre-registration. This scoping 
review was prepared following guidelines from the Preferred Reporting Items 
for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for scoping reviews 
(PRISMA-ScR)40. The methodology for this scoping review follows the framework 
established in the PRISMA extension for scoping reviews, which builds on the 
Joanna Briggs Institute’s guidelines41 for conducting scoping reviews. Note that the 
current CEE Guidelines for Systematic Reviews in Environmental Management42 
(version 4.2, March 2013) do not provide recommendations for the number of 
people who should conduct eligibility screening, although the Guidelines implicitly 
suggest that a single screener may be acceptable provided that an assessment of 
screener reliability is conducted. According to the latest CEE evidence synthesis 
protocols published in Environmental Evidence journal (January–July 2017), 
screening by a single person, subject to a check of screener reliability using a subset 
of articles, is the currently practiced approach in most cases42.
Scoping reviews are designed to summarize studies of varying methodological 
designs while highlighting key areas for future research and engagement43,44. 
This scoping review leveraged a data–science framework to accelerate the work 
within each of the individual steps, which are described below. This framework 
comprises five steps: identifying the research question; identifying relevant studies; 
study selection; extracting and charting the data; and collating, summarizing and 
reporting the results. The protocol used in this scoping review was registered on 
the Open Science Framework and is available in Supplementary Annex 2 (ref. 45).
The guiding question for this scoping review was, “What are the market, 
non-market, regulatory and compliance incentives or compulsory/voluntary 
programmes for farmers to adopt environmentally sustainable practices?”.
This study spans both developed and developing world contexts and 
characterizes how the incentives associated with different instruments may  
affect adoption given local institutional, environmental and socioeconomic factors. 
It was not limited by geography or country status.
The goal of this scoping review was to make recommendations about how 
to promote environmental practices for more sustainable, and at the same time 
competitive, agricultural production systems. This scoping review looks at the 
overall landscape of evidence of these instruments and their effectiveness in 
achieving higher levels of productivity, profitability and equity.
Information sources, searches and citation management. A comprehensive 
search strategy was developed to identify all available research pertaining to the 
market, non-market, regulatory and cross-compliance incentives for farmers to 
adopt environmentally sustainable practices. Search terms included variations of 
the key concepts in the research question: farmers, incentives, implementation 
of agricultural practices and environmental impact (see Appendix A of 
Supplementary Annex 2 (ref. 45) for a presentation of the search strategy in its 
entirety such that it may be reproduced in CAB Abstracts).
Research synthesis experts conducted searches of the following electronic 
databases: CAB Abstracts (access via CAB Direct); Web of Science Core Collection 
(access via Web of Science); Scopus (access via Elsevier); and EconLit (access via 
EBSCOhost). A search of grey literature sources was also conducted. The grey 
literature searches were conducted using custom web-scraping scripts. The search 
strings were tested per website before initiating web-scraping. An existing Google 
Chrome extension was needed to scrape dynamically generated websites.
A data science team supported much of our process. The results from the 
databases and the grey literature searches were combined and deduplicated using 
a Python script. Duplicates were detected using title, abstract and same year of 
publication where year of publication was a match, where title cosine similarity 
was greater than 85% and where an abstract’s cosine similarity greater than 80% 
or one of the abstracts (or both) was empty. When duplicates were found, the 
Box 3 | Policy recommendations
Notwithstanding the limitations and gaps found in the literature, 
the following is a set of tested principles to follow when design-
ing interventions or policy instruments. These are based on the 
most solid evidence found on the effectiveness of incentives to 
motivate the adoption of sustainable practices that, in turn, led to 
better indicators of productivity, profitability and environmental 
sustainability of farms under different production systems and 
conditional factors.
Balance the incentives and outcomes. Incentives must be high 
enough to motivate a change in production practices. This is 
because productivity and profitability gains can be insufficient 
to compensate for the total cost of the initial capital require-
ments and any unexpected costs of the proposed agricultural 
interventions.
Know your farmers. The likelihood of farmers adopting sustain-
able agricultural practices will vary depending on their experi-
ence, education, access to information and level of risk-aversion. 
Policymakers must be familiar with the farmers, and tailor the 
incentive programmes for them by incorporating the range of 
personal, political, institutional and biophysical factors into the 
design of the programme.
Keep it simple. Instruments should be simple to understand and 
communicate given that farmers dislike instruments that are too 
complex (such as some legal regulations) and are therefore less 
likely to adopt them. Besides, complexity makes instruments 
harder to communicate and more expensive to adopt or enforce.
Complement. Single interventions are less likely to succeed, 
hence the need to use a combination of policy instruments. For 
example, the provision of technical assistance and extension ser-
vices contributes to the understanding of farmers and helps them 
adopt proposed practices.
Behavioural preferences matter. Given that people have a tendency 
to follow the behaviour of others, farmers’ preferences should be 
taken into account when designing incentives, acknowledging 
that they vary depending on the target population.
Be prepared for a long time horizon. The time horizon depends 
on the agricultural practice, the production system and the bio-
logical cycle. This means the opportunity cost of time has to be 
considered and financial tools have to be put in place so that cash 
flow problems do not jeopardize the intervention.
Create an enabling environment. Incentives that make the adop-
tion of sustainable practices attractive depend heavily on an 
enabling economic and financial environment. Beyond incen-
tives, it is necessary to improve the general conditions that influ-
ence agricultural systems. There are many factors that influence 
the capacity and willingness of farmers to invest in land, water 
and forest conservation and to pursue sustainable practices such 
as agricultural institutions, policies and regulations, social pro-
tection, infrastructure and markets, prices, off-farm employ-
ment opportunities and structural poverty.
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citation priority order was Scopus, CAB Abstracts, Web of Science and then grey 
literature sources.
Following deduplication, each citation was analysed using a boosted machine 
learning model. The model added more than 30 new metadata fields that identified 
population, geographies, interventions, study design type and outcomes of interest. 
This allowed for accelerated identification of potential articles for exclusion at the 
title/abstract screening stage.
The combined search results and new metadata were shared with the research 
team using Excel spreadsheets and through the screening platform Covidence. 
The metadata was made available in Covidence46 in the abstract field delineated 
by hash-tags (###) using a global open-source converter that can translate existing 
bibliographic data from a .csv format to .ris format.
Study selection and eligibility criteria. The systematic review software Covidence 
was used for title, abstract and full-text screening decision-making. Article 
screening took place in three phases: title screening, abstract screening and 
full-text screening. At all screening stages, citations were screened for relevance 
against the following inclusion and exclusion criteria; reasons for exclusion were 
documented at the full-text screening phase.
Citations were included in this scoping review if they met all of the inclusion 
criteria listed in Box 2.
Exclusion criteria were the inverse of the inclusion criteria. Each citation that 
met all of the inclusion criteria at the title and abstract and full-text screening 
phases was included, and each citation that met one of the exclusion criteria at the 
title, abstract, or full-text screening phases was excluded.
Title/abstract screening was initiated for the 17,936 articles with two 
independent reviewers reviewing each citation. After the first 200 articles, due to 
the very large number of citations to screen and because there was a strong degree 
of inter-rater reliability, a rapid review, single-screener methodology was adopted 
for all of the remaining citations. The rapid review process comprised a title review 
followed by an abstract review of included citations. After this first stage, 1,792 
papers were selected; of these, 1,694 were found in scholarly databases and 98 were 
found in grey literature sources.
The inclusion criteria were complex and nuanced, particularly the connection 
of the adoption of incentives to sustainability outcomes, and the degree to which 
a study focused on incentives or their adoption. These matters of focus and 
connection could not be captured by a search strategy alone, but required human 
judgement. This resulted in a large number of irrelevant results from the initial 
searches. Among the 1,215 articles that were excluded at the abstract screening 
phase, 442 were excluded because they did not include an explicit analysis of 
the impact of the incentives on income, production, productivity, profits and/or 
environmental sustainability and 418 were excluded because there was no explicit 
focus on incentives for sustainable environmental practices. For more information, 
the PRISMA flow diagram (Supplementary Fig. 1) shows the steps followed for the 
screening process and selection exercise.
Following Waffenschmidt et al., we conducted a double-blind pre-test of ten 
articles and then assessed inter-rater reliability using the Fleiss Kappa indicator 
to test for inter-rater reliability in the full-text screening47. This indicator is a 
statistical measure for assessing the reliability of agreement between a fixed 
number of raters when classifying a number of items. The measure calculates the 
degree of agreement in classification over that which would be expected by chance.
After calculating the indicator, we can say that the level of potential bias of a 
single-screener method introduced here is not significant, given that the kappa 
value of at least 0.61 indicates substantial agreement and we have a value of 0.7.
In the next selection round, the single -screener methodology was also used, 
maintaining the same inclusion/exclusion criteria. After this process, 577 citations 
were kept; of these, 551 were found in scholarly databases, 27 were found in grey 
literature sources and one was removed as a duplicate. The proportion of resources 
from the grey literature versus scholarly databases remained consistent throughout 
the screening process, with 4.48% of the resources originally identified and 4.88% 
of the resources eligible for full-text inclusion coming from the grey literature.
Because a very large set of citations was included for full-text screening, a 
semi-structured, stratified randomized sample of 99 citations was selected. Our 
early review process suggested that certain categories of papers (for example, 
regarding forestry policy) were more common than others. In an effort to 
capture relevant citations in less prevalent categories, we used smooth inverse 
document frequency and cosine distances to create a vector space representation 
of the contents of the titles, key words and abstracts of the 577 articles. We 
then clustered the vectors—each article is represented as a vector of terms and 
frequencies—into 20 clusters using Ward’s method for hierarchical clustering48. 
A threshold of 20 clusters resulted in clusters ranging in size from 5 to 300 
articles. The basis of cluster composition for the smaller clusters was moderately 
discernible (for example, ecosystem services and water-related), whereas the basis 
for agglomeration of the larger clusters was not immediately evident. We then 
implemented a stratified random sampling process to identify the set of 99 articles 
from the 20 clusters as a function of cluster size. The Orange Data Mining Toolbox 
was used for the analysis49. Finally, 6 of these 99 articles were not included as they 
were written in a language not spoken by any of the authors of this research or 
because of their unavailability.
Data extraction. A data extraction template was developed based on Barrett 
et al. to document the data, study type and context of each citation, and all 
themes of interest: incentives, outcomes, measurements of impact and the cost 
of intervention50. The data extraction template was tested by the review team 
before use to make sure that all the necessary information for the analysis of the 
research question was included. Data was extracted by the reviewers using an excel 
worksheet including the following information:
•	 A categorization of incentives by market, non-market, regulatory and compli-
ance incentives for farmers.
•	 Type of outcomes covered in question of the study: environmentally sustain-
able, profitability and productivity.
•	 Other information relevant for the analysis including characteristics of 
the stakeholders, commodity (crop, pasture, aquaculture, forestry), data 
(cross-section, panel, survey, interviews, policy analysis), methodology 
(econometrics, systematic review, meta-analysis, randomized controlled tri-
als), study (quantitative or qualitative).
•	 Questions relating to the quality of the paper, the link between incentives and 
adoption, measurement of the incentive, the type of outcome and its measure-
ment and cost of the incentive.
The retrieval of hundreds of PDFs for full-text screening is a repetitive and 
time-consuming task. A Python script was created that would handle the repetitive 
tasks of PDF discovery, download and file renaming using Google Scholar (the 
code is available in GitHub). The script read the bibliographic data from an Excel 
spreadsheet and then executed a script to retrieve the full-text PDF. The possible 
returning results are ‘not found, ‘backed by a paywall’, ‘available for download’ or 
‘available for request’. If the article is spotted in the search results, the download 
link is clicked, and the article will be auto-renamed and marked as being 
downloaded. This process significantly cut down the time needed to retrieve PDFs, 
and on average 200 PDFs were searched and retrieved in 3–4 h.
The collation, summary and report of the results. This research was based on 
three pillars—incentives, adoption and outcomes—in looking at the question of 
how the incentives farmers receive influence the adoption of good environmental 
practices. These three pillars are important in answering the question, but the 
links between them are crucial as well. The connection between the incentives and 
actual adoption, as well as the connection between adoption and the outcomes 
identified play a key role in this scoping review (Fig. 6).
Incentives were categorized as market-based and non-market-based, regulatory 
and cross-compliance incentives for farmers to adopt sustainable environmental 
practices and integrated risk management systems (crop insurance, catastrophic 
insurance, price options, mitigation and adaptation programmes and so on) 
in a voluntary or compulsory way. The outcomes were identified as practices 
adopted by farmers, and their impact on the multiple objectives of environmental 
sustainability, increased productivity and profitability.
An appraisal for quality was done for the 44 articles that passed the inclusion 
selection process, were part of the sample chosen and had the link between 
incentives and adoption, and adoption and outcomes.
The assessment was done by the authors of this research from a scale of 1 
to 5, 1 being the lowest. The quality assessment was based on the clarity of the 
research question, justification of the research approach given the question 
of the study, clear description of the methodology used and robustness of the 
chosen methodology. However, it was not used to further exclude papers.  
From the 44 articles, 23% received the highest score, followed by 32% with a 
quality index of 4 and 39% with a 3, less than 10% of the papers were assigned 
a score of less than 3. The previously completed screening process was key in 
ensuring that articles that did not have substantive evidence were not included 
in this last stage.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the 
corresponding author on reasonable request.
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